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On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium
in Symmetric Two-Player Zero-Sum Games
with Integer Payoffs
Michel Le Breton ∗
Summary
Consider a symmetric two-player zero-sum game with in-
teger payoffs. We prove that if there exists an integer such
that all upper-diagonal payoff entries have the same non-
zero reminder when divided by this integer, then the game
has a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Résumé
Dans la classe des jeux symétriques de deux joueurs de
somme nulle et à paiements entiers, il est démontré que, s’il
existe un entier tel que toutes les entrées de la matrice des
paiements au dessus de la diagonale aient un reste identique
et non nul dans la division par cet entier, alors l’équilibre
(en stratégies mixtes) est unique.
∗. Gremaq and Idei. I would like to thank John Duggan, Hideo Konishi, Jean-François Laslier,
Richard MacKelvey and Arunava Sen for their comments on the content of this note. This note is
dedicated to Louis-André in memory of our many conversations on various topics of game theory.
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1. Introduction
Laffond, Laslier and Le Breton (1997) proved that if the off-diagonal payoff
entries of a finite symmetric two-player zero-sum game are odd integers, then the
game has a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies. This result was generalizing
itself a former result demonstrated by Fisher and Ryan (1992) and Laffond, Laslier
and Le Breton (1993) for the special case where the off-diagonal entries are either
equal to 1 or to -1.
The purpose of this note is to offer one more curiosity along the same lines.
Precisely we prove that if the upper-diagonal payoff entries of a symmetric two-
player zero-sum game are integers satisfying a certain congruence property, then
the game has a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies. The congruence property is
a generalization of the oddness condition and therefore the result in Laffond, Laslier
and Le Breton (1997) follows from this result. The proof uses only elementary
linear algebra and number theory. We also argue that the plurality game in Political
Science may have payoff entries satisfying this congruence property.
2. The Result
A two-player zero-sum game is a triple (X1,X2,m) where X1(resp. X2) denotes
the set of pure strategies of player 1 (resp. 2) and m : X1×X2 →ℜ denotes the
payoff function of player 1 (The payoff function of player 2 is –m). It is finite if
X1 and X2 are finite sets. It is symmetric if X1 = X2 ≡ X and m(x1,x2) +m(x2,x1) = 0
for all (x2,x1) ∈ X ×X .
Consider a finite two-player zero-sum game (X1,X2,m). A mixed strategy for
player 1 (resp. 2) is a probability distribution over X1(resp. X2). Denote by P(X1)
(resp. P(X2)) the set of probability distributions over X1(resp. X2). A pair (p1,p2)
in P(X1)×P(X2) is an equilibrium (in mixed strategies) if it satisfies the following
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inequalities: ∑
x1∈X1
∑
x2∈X2
p1(x1)p2(x2)m(x1,x2)
≥
∑
x1∈X1
∑
x2∈X2
q1(x1)p2(x2)m(x1,x2) for all q1 ∈ P(X1)
and ∑
x1∈X1
∑
x2∈X2
p1(x1)p2(x2)m(x1,x2)
≤
∑
x1∈X1
∑
x2∈X2
p1(x1)q2(x2)m(x1,x2) for all q2 ∈ P(X1)
Since X1 and X2 are finite, there exists equilibria in mixed strategies and since it is
zero-sum the set of equilibria is a product space P1 ×P2 ⊆ P(X1)×P(X2). Hereafter
a strategy in P1 (resp. P2) will be referred to as an optimal play for player 1
(resp. 2). We denote by Supp(p) the support of a probability distribution p. An
equilibrium in mixed strategies (p1,p2) is quasi-strict (Harsanyi (1973)) if Supp(p1)
(resp. Supp(p2) is the set of pure-stategy best responses to p2 (resp. p1). When the
game is symmetric P1 = P2 and we will drop the reference to the player number.
Our main result is the following:
Theorem – Let (X ,m) be a finite symmetric two-player zero-sum game with
integer payoffs. If there exist an ordering ≺ of X and integers d and r such that
r , 0 and m(x,y) = r (mod d) for all (x,y) ∈X ×X such that x ≺ y, then (X ,m) has a
unique equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Remark 2.1 – We cannot replace the condition in the theorem by the weaker
(when d ≥ 3) condition: there exist an ordering ≺ of X and an integer d such that
m(x,y) , 0 (mod d) for all (x,y) ∈ X ×X such that x ≺ y. For instance, all the off-
diagonal payoff entries of the symmetric two-player zero-sum game represented
by the matrix below are relatively prime with 3 and, however, it is easy to verify
that there are several optimal plays. The game has 4 strategies. It is tedious but
elementary to show that if the game has only 3 strategies then whenever the
off-diagonal payoff entries are different from 0, the game has a unique equilibrium
which is either pure or completely mixed.

0 1 1 –2
–1 0 1 –1
–1 –1 0 1
2 1 –1 0

Remark 2.2 – The condition of the theorem is verified when all the off-
diagonal payoff entries are odd integers. In that case the ordering ≺ does not
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matter. Otherwise the ordering of the strategies may matter as illustrated by the
symmetric two-player zero-sum game represented by the matrix below.
0 –3 7
3 0 –8
–7 8 0

Remark 2.3 – The equilibrium is quasi-strict. This follows easily from the
Equalizer Theorem (Rahgavan (1994)).
Remark 2.4 – The number of strategies in the support of the optimal play is
odd. This follows from Gale, Kuhn and Tucker (1950) or Kaplansky (1945).
Remark 2.5 – A number of “artificial” generalizations of the theorem can
be provided. Let (x1,X2,m) be a finite square (#X1 = #X2) two-player zero-sum
game with integer payoffs. The proof technique of the theorem shows that if all
diagonal entries are multiples of a nonzero integer d and all upper diagonal (or
lower diagonal) entries have the same nonzero reminder r when divided by d,
then (X1,X2,m) has at most one completely mixed equilibrium. The same assertion
even holds for finite square two-player games (not necessarily zero-sum) with a
unique vector of equilibrium payoffs, a property satisfied by two-player zero-sum
games but by other games as well e.g. almost strictly competitive games (Aumann
(1961)).
The theorem can be used for the analysis of some games arising in Political
Science. Consider the situation where two political parties compete for the votes
of an electorate through their political platforms chosen in X . Denote by V the
electorate and for all v ∈V , let Pv be the preference of voter v over X . We assume
that Pv is a linear order and denote by L the set of linear orders over X . Finally
we assume that each party is interested in maximizing its electoral support 1. To
summarize, we are considering a symmetric two-player constant-sum game where
X is the set of pure strategies of both parties and the payoff of party 1 when
it plays x and party 2 plays y is VP(x,y) where VP(x,y) ≡ # {v ∈V : xPvy}
2. It is
straightforward to see that this game is strategically equivalent to the symmetric
two-player zero-sum game (X ,m) where m(x,y) ≡VP(x,y) –VP(y,x).
Since for all x , y, m(x,y) = 2VP(x,y) –#V , we observe that all the off-diagonal
payoff entries inherit the parity of #V . Debord (1987) has proved 3 that any skew-
1. This is the so-called plurality game (see e.g. Laffond, Laslier and Le Breton (1994) or Ordeshook
(1988)).
2. VP (x,x) ≡
#N
2 for all x ∈ X .
3. For the sake of completeness, a short alternative proof of Debord’s theorem is provided at the
end of the manuscript.
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symmetric matrix whose off-diagonal entries are either all odd or all even can be
obtained through this construction.
This result justifies the interest of our theorem for the analysis of the plurality
game. Indeed take a skew-symmetric matrix satisfying the congruence property in
the theorem and multiply by 2 all the entries. From Debord‘s result such matrix
describes a plurality game for a particular electorate and preferences within the
electorate. We are done since the game obtained by multiplying all the entries by
2 is strategically equivalent to the original game.
3. Proof of the Theorem
Let n = #X . For notational simplicity the elements of X are labelled from 1 to
n and without loss of generality we assume that the order ≺ is the natural order.
Further m(i, j) is denoted simply by mij.
Claim 1: Let p be an optimal play. We have:∑
i∈Supp(p)
mijpi = 0 for all j ∈ Supp(p)
Claim 2: If there are several optimal plays, there are several optimal plays with
the same support.
The two claims follow from standard results on two-player zero-sum games
(see e.g. Rahgavan (1994)) 4
By assumption, for all i and j such that i ≺ j there exists an integer dij such that
mij = dijd+ r. Without loss of generality we may assume that d and r are relatively
prime since if they were not, we would obtain two new integers relatively prime
and satisfying the conditions of the theorem by dividing d and r by their common
divisors.
From claim 2, it is enough to prove that there does not exist two optimal plays
with the same support. Suppose on the contrary that there exist two optimal plays
with the same support, say without loss of generality {1,2, .....,k}. Then we deduce
from claim 1 that the homogenous system of linear equations:
k∑
i=1
mijqi = 0 for all i = 1, .....,k.
and
k∑
i=1
qi = 0
4. The value of a symmetric two-player zero-sum game is equal to 0.
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has a non-zero solution i.e. that the nullspace of the linear operator from ℜk to
ℜk+1 described by the matrix A below has a dimension at least equal to 1.
A ≡

0 m12 . . m1k
–m12 0 . . m2k
. . . . .
. . . . .
–m1k –m2k . . 0
1 1 . . 1

This implies that RankA ≤ k–1 i.e. that all the k×k determinants extracted from A
are equal to 0. We show now that this is not possible. Consider the determinant D
of the matrix extracted from A by deleting the kth line of A i.e.:
D ≡
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 m12 . . . m1k–1 m1k
–m12 0 . . . m2k–1 m2k
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
–m1k–1 –m2k–1 . . . 0 mk–1k
1 1 . . . 1 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
By using the linearity of D with respect to the first column, we obtain:
D = d
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 m12 . . . m1k–1 m1k
–d12 0 . . . m2k–1 m2k
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
–d1k–1 –m2k–1 . . . 0 mk–1k
0 1 . . . 1 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 m12 . . . m1k–1 m1k
–r 0 . . . m2k–1 m2k
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
–r –m2k–1 . . . 0 mk–1k
1 1 . . . 1 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
The first term in the above sum is a multiple of d. Now consider the second
determinant in the sum. By using the linearity of this determinant with respect to
its second column, we obtain that it is the sum of a determinant which is a multiple
of d and another determinant. After a repeated application of this argument, we
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obtain:
D = multiple of d+ rk–1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 1 1 . . 1 1
–1 0 1 . . 1 1
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
–1 –1 –1 . . 0 1
1 1 1 . . 1 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
By using a straightforward induction argument, it is easy to show that:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 1 1 . . 1 1
–1 0 1 . . 1 1
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
–1 –1 –1 . . 0 1
1 1 1 . . 1 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= (–1)k–1
To summarize: D = multiple of d+ (–r)k–1. Since d and r are relatively prime, d and
(–r)k–1 are relatively prime too. This implies, as desired that D , 0.
4. Proof of Debord’s Theorem
Let M be a skew-symmetric matrix of order n such that either mij is even for
all i , j or mij is odd for all i , j. We prove
5 that there exists a finite set V and a
function P from V into L such that: mij ≡VP(i, j) –VP(j, i) for all i , j.
Case 1: mij is even for all i , j.
To every pair (i, j) be such that i , j and mij > 0
6 we associate the following two
linear orders denoted respectively by P1
ij
and P2
ij
,where P˜ij is an arbitrary linear
order over X\{i, j}.
iP1ijj, iP
1
ijk and jP
1
ijk for all k , i, j and kP
1
ijk
‘ iff kP˜ijk‘ for all k,k‘ , i, j.
iP2ijj,kP
2
iji and kP
1
ijj for all k , i, j and kP
1
ijk
‘ iff k‘P˜ijk for all k,k‘ , i, j.
Now consider an electorate V = ∪
{i,j:mij>0}
Vij where the sets Vij are pairwise disjoints
and #Vij =mij. Partition Vij in two sets V
1
ij
and V 2
ij
of equal size and for each v ∈
Vij, let Pv = P
1
ij
if v ∈ V 1
ij
and Pv = P
2
ij
if v ∈ V 2
ij
. It is straightforward to verify that:
mij ≡VP(i, j) –VP(j, i) for all i , j.
5. The proof is inspired by the proof of Mc Garvey (1953) for the case of digraphs.
6. If all the entries mij are equal to 0, then just take an electorate with two voters having opposite
preferences.
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Case 2: mij is odd for all i , j.
Let M‘ be the matrix M +N where:
N ≡

0 1 . . 1
–1 0 . . 1
. . . . .
. . . . .
–1 –1 . . 0

From case 1, we deduce that there exists V ‘ and P‘ from V ‘ into L such that:
m‘ij ≡VP‘(i, j) –VP‘(j, i) for all i , j. Now add to V ‘ one individual v with preference
Pv defined by: iPvj iff i > j. It is easy to verify that: mij ≡VP(i, j)–VP(j, i) for all i , j
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